A Utopian re-regulated financial sector, as envisaged by some pundits, would seek to avoid financial institutions’ taking excessive risks that could create systemic fragility, and give supervisors enough power to forestall any bubbles they saw developing. This regime would continue to facilitate the smooth and safe channeling of savings into socially productive investments, guaranteeing the future prosperity of a newer, low-risk world.
Before Americans — or Canadians — put too much stock in this imaginary future, however, they should ask if a regulator could recognize excessive risk and fragility as it began to emerge, could spot the point at which a boom that delivered socially productive innovation became a destructive bubble and subsequently design measures to halt the transformation without also discarding productivity gains. And they should ask how this wisdom would be translated into regulations that could be understood, followed and enforced by ordinary human beings in an environment where disagreements about how to interpret them will inevitably arise, and where decision makers’ own interests are affected by regulations’ interpretation.
The crucial point, which must not be missed in a populist rush to re-regulation, is that today’s financial systems in the U.S. and elsewhere are not the product of an unregulated market, but of a long history of interactions between regulatory interventions and private innovations in response to them.
The above is from the extremely wise Canadian monetary theorist, a student of the late Milton Friedman I believed and a retired professor at U of Ontario, David Laidler.
There are other bits in the piece where Secretary Geithner should pay attention, like this one:
First, as the U.S. financial system reconfigures, its evolution may be no more satisfactory under a newly minted set of rules designed to prevent past accidents than it would be if the process were driven by piecemeal, profit-seeking trial and error on the part of the private sector.
Regulators and the politicians who oversee them must remember that the profit motive is ever present, and that those who found ways to make money under past regulatory models will seek to do so under the next regime, too. The trick will be to design incentives so individuals’ behaviour stabilizes the system, rather than undermines it.
Read the whole thing here. And a list of David Laidler's works could be found here.
Friday, March 27, 2009
Thursday, March 26, 2009
Sentence to Ponder
Back in graduate school circa early 1990s when I was taking Macro II taught by Tyler Cowen, I vividly remembered he once decribed the RBC (Real Business Cycle) view of what happened during the Great Depression in the 1920-30s as follows:
All workers decide to take a long vacation at the same time.
That is what I learn as part of the then State of the Art Macroeconomics. Seriously hope that those economic gurus who are at the helm power do not subscribe to that view.
If you were the President, imagine what your response would be if you senior staff told you, "you know what, my former professor told me that the current downturn has nothing to worry about, high unemployment only reflects workers have similar preferences with regarding to their leisure/labor choice." Amen!
All workers decide to take a long vacation at the same time.
That is what I learn as part of the then State of the Art Macroeconomics. Seriously hope that those economic gurus who are at the helm power do not subscribe to that view.
If you were the President, imagine what your response would be if you senior staff told you, "you know what, my former professor told me that the current downturn has nothing to worry about, high unemployment only reflects workers have similar preferences with regarding to their leisure/labor choice." Amen!
Tuesday, March 10, 2009
What Do You Call a Nerd in Ten Years?
BOSS.
Source here.
It's a story about Quants, yes the math genius/nerds (delete whatever is appropriate) that have some commentators blamed them for indirectly causing the current financial mess through their math models which help create all the complex financial products.
But if math geeks and their models were indeed the source of the current problem, how reliable would it be now that governments all over the world are using similar models created by the same geeks to help assess whether banks are viable (the US Treasury is stress testing the major banks as I type and I know as a fact that HKMA, the local banking sector watchdog, asks local banks to perform such stress test all the time).
Source here.
It's a story about Quants, yes the math genius/nerds (delete whatever is appropriate) that have some commentators blamed them for indirectly causing the current financial mess through their math models which help create all the complex financial products.
But if math geeks and their models were indeed the source of the current problem, how reliable would it be now that governments all over the world are using similar models created by the same geeks to help assess whether banks are viable (the US Treasury is stress testing the major banks as I type and I know as a fact that HKMA, the local banking sector watchdog, asks local banks to perform such stress test all the time).
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